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ABSTRACT
Motivated by cloud security concerns, there is an increas-
ing interest in database systems that can store and support
queries over encrypted data. A common architecture for
such systems is to use a trusted component such as a cryp-
tographic co-processor for query processing that is used to
securely decrypt data and perform computations in plain-
text. The trusted component has limited memory, so most
of the (input and intermediate) data is kept encrypted in an
untrusted storage and moved to the trusted component on
“demand.”
In this setting, even with strong encryption, the data ac-
cess pattern from untrusted storage has the potential to re-
veal sensitive information; indeed, all existing systems that
use a trusted component for query processing over encrypted
data have this vulnerability. In this paper, we undertake the
first formal study of secure query processing, where an ad-
versary having full knowledge of the query (text) and ob-
serving the query execution learns nothing about the under-
lying database other than the result size of the query on the
database. We introduce a simpler notion, oblivious query
processing, and show formally that a query admits secure
query processing iff it admits oblivious query processing.
We present oblivious query processing algorithms for a rich
class of database queries involving selections, joins, group-
ing and aggregation. For queries not handled by our al-
gorithms, we provide some initial evidence that designing
oblivious (and therefore secure) algorithms would be hard
via reductions from two simple, well-studied problems that
are generally believed to be hard. Our study of oblivious
query processing also reveals interesting connections to
database join theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a trend towards moving database function-
ality to the cloud and many cloud providers have a
database-as-a-service (DbaaS) offering [2, 21]. A DbaaS
allows an application to store its database in the cloud
and run queries over it. Moving a database to the cloud,
while providing well-documented advantages [8], intro-
duces data security concerns [28]. Any data stored on
a cloud machine is potentially accessible to snooping
administrators and to attackers who gain illegal ac-
cess to cloud systems. There have been well-known
instances of data security breaches arising from such
adversaries [30].
A simple mechanism to address these security con-
cerns is encryption. By keeping data stored in the
cloud encrypted we can thwart the kinds of attacks
mentioned above. However encryption makes compu-
tation and in particular query processing over data dif-
ficult. Standard encryption schemes are designed to
“hide” data while we need to “see” data to perform
computations over it. Addressing these challenges and
designing database systems that support query process-
ing over encrypted data is an active area of research [4,
6, 14, 27, 32] and industry effort [22, 23].
A common architecture [4, 6] for query processing
over encrypted data involves using trusted hardware such
as a cryptographic co-processor [16], designed to be in-
accessible to an adversary. The trusted hardware has
access to the encryption key, some computational ca-
pabilities, and limited storage. During query process-
ing, encrypted data is moved to the trusted hardware,
decrypted, and computed on. The trusted hardware
has limited storage so it is infeasible to store within it
the entire input database or intermediate results gener-
ated during query processing; these are typically stored
encrypted in an untrusted storage and moved to the
trusted hardware only when necessary. Other approaches
to query processing over encrypted data rely on (par-
tial) homomorphic encryption [14, 27, 32] or using the
client as the trusted module1 [14, 32]. These approaches
have limitations in terms of the class of queries they can
handle or data shipping costs they incur (see Section 7),
and they are not the main focus of this paper.
The systems that use trusted hardware currently pro-
vide an operational security guarantee that any data
outside of trusted hardware is encrypted [4, 6]. How-
ever, this operational guarantee does not translate to
end-to-end data security since, even with strong encryp-
tion, the data movement patterns to and from trusted
1All of our results hold for this setting, but they are less
interesting.
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hardware can potentially reveal information about the
underlying data. We call such information leakage dy-
namic information leakage and we illustrate it using a
simple join example.
Example 1. Consider a database with tables Patient
(PatId,Name,City) and Visit(PatId,Date,Doctor) storing pa-
tient details and their doctor visits. These tables are en-
crypted by encrypting each record using a standard en-
cryption scheme and stored in untrusted memory. Us-
ing suitably strong encryption2, we can ensure that the
adversary does not learn anything from the encrypted
tables other than their sizes. (Such an encryption scheme
is non-deterministic so two encryptions of the same
record would look seemingly unrelated.)
Consider a query that joins these two tables on PatId
column using a nested loop join algorithm. The algo-
rithm moves each patient record to the trusted hard-
ware where it is decrypted. For each patient record, all
records of Visit table are moved one after the other to
the trusted hardware and decrypted. Whenever the cur-
rent patient record p and visit record v have the same
PatId value, the join record 〈p, v〉 is encrypted and pro-
duced as output. An adversary observing the sequence
of records being moved in and out of trusted hardware
learns the join-graph. For example, if 5 output records
are produced in the time interval between the first and
second Patient record moving to the trusted hardware,
the adversary learns that some patient had 5 doctor vis-
its.
The above discussion raises the natural question
whether we can design query processing algorithms that
avoid such dynamic information leakage and provide
end-to-end data security. The focus of this paper is to
seek an answer to this question; in particular, as a con-
tribution of this paper, we formalize a strong notion of
(end-to-end) secure query processing, develop efficient
and secure query processing algorithms for a large class
of queries, and discuss why queries outside of this class
are unlikely to have efficient secure algorithms.
There exists an extensive body of work Oblivious
RAM (ORAM) Simulation [10, 12, 29, 33], a general
technique that makes memory accesses of an arbitrary
program appear random by continuously shuffling mem-
ory and adding spurious accesses. In Example 1, with
ORAM simulation the data accesses would appear ran-
dom to an adversary and we can show that the adver-
sary learns no information other than the total number
of data accesses.
Given general ORAM simulation, why design special-
ized secure query processing algorithms? We defer a full
discussion of this issue to Section 1.2, but for a brief mo-
tivation consider sorting an encrypted array of size n.
Just as in Example 1, the data access patterns of a stan-
2And padding to mask record sizes.
dard sorting algorithm such as quicksort reveals infor-
mation about the underlying data. An ORAM simula-
tion of quicksort would hide the access patterns; indeed,
the adversary does not even learn that a sort operation
is being performed. However, with current state-of-the-
art ORAM algorithms, it would incur an overhead of
Θ(log2 n) per access3 of the original algorithm making
the overall complexity of sorting Θ(n log3 n). Instead,
we could exploit the semantics of sorting and design
a secure sorting algorithm that has the (optimal) time
complexity of Θ(n log n) [11]. Here the adversary does
learn that the operation being performed is sorting (but
does not learn anything about the input being sorted)
but we get significant performance benefits. As we show
in the rest of the paper, designing specialized secure
query processing algorithms helps us gain similar per-
formance advantages over generic ORAM simulations.
The exploration in this paper is part of the Cipherbase
project [7], a larger effort to design and prototype a
comprehensive database system, relying on specialized
hardware for storing and processing encrypted data in
the cloud.
1.1 Overview of Contributions
Secure Query Processing: Informally, we define a
query processing algorithm for a query Q to be secure
if an adversary having full knowledge of the text of Q
and observing the execution of Q does not learn any-
thing about the underlying database D other than the
result size of Q over D. The query execution happens
within a trusted module (TM) not accessible to the ad-
versary. The input database and possibly intermediate
results generated during query execution are stored (en-
crypted) in an untrusted memory (UM). The adversary
has access to the untrusted memory and in particular
can observe the sequence of memory locations accessed
and data values read and written during query execu-
tion. Throughout, we assume a passive adversary, who
does not actively interfere with query processing.
When defining security, we grant the adversary knowl-
edge of query Q which ensures that data security does
not depend on the query being kept secret. Databases
are typically accessed through applications and it is of-
ten easy to guess the query from a knowledge of the
application. Our formal definition of secure query pro-
cessing (Section 2.2) generalizes the informal definition
above and incorporates query security in addition to
data security. Our formal definition relies on machin-
ery from standard cryptography such as indistinguisha-
bility experiments, but there are some subtleties specific
to database systems and applications that we capture;
Appendix A discusses these issues in greater detail.
We note that simply communicating the (encrypted)
3Assuming “small” polylog(n) trusted memory.
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query result over an untrusted network reveals the re-
sult size, so a stronger notion of security seems imprac-
tical in a cloud setting. Also, our definition of secure
query processing implies that an adversary with an ac-
cess to the cloud server gets no advantage over an ad-
versary who can observe only the communications be-
tween the client and the database server, assuming both
of them have knowledge of the query.
Oblivious Query Processing Algorithms: Cen-
tral to the idea of secure query processing is the notion
of oblivious query processing. Informally, a query pro-
cessing algorithm is oblivious if its (untrusted) memory
access pattern is independent of the database contents
once we fix the query and its input and output sizes. We
can easily argue that any secure algorithm is oblivious:
otherwise, the algorithm has different memory access
patterns for different database instances, so the adver-
sary learns something about the database instance by
observing the memory access pattern of the algorithm.
Interestingly, obliviousness is also a sufficient condition
in the sense that any oblivious algorithm can be made
secure using standard cryptography (Theorem 3). The
idea of reducing security to memory access obliviousness
was originally proposed in [10] for general programs in
the context of software protection. Note that oblivious-
ness is defined with respect to memory accesses to the
untrusted store; any memory accesses internal to TM
are invisible to the adversary and do not affect security.
Our challenge therefore is to design oblivious algo-
rithms for database queries. We seek oblivious algo-
rithms that have small TM memory footprint since all
practical realizations of the trusted module such as cryp-
tographic co-processors have limited storage (few MBs)
[16]. Without this restriction a simple oblivious algo-
rithm is to read the entire database into TM and per-
form query processing completely within TM.
To illustrate challenges in designing oblivious query
processing algorithms consider the simple join query
R(A, . . .) ./ S(A, . . .) which seeks all pairs of tuples from
R and S that agree on attribute A. Figure 1 shows two
instances for this join, represented as a binary “join-
graph”. Each R and S tuple is shown as a vertex and
its attribute A value is shown adjacent to it (lower case
letters a, b, . . .). An edge exists between an R tuple and
an S tuple having the same value in attribute A, and
each edge represents a join output. We note that both
instances have the same input output characteristics,
|R| = |S| = |R ./ S| = 16, so an oblivious algorithm
is required to have the same memory access pattern for
both instances. However, the internal structure of the
join graph is greatly different. All “natural” join al-
gorithms that use sorting or hashing to bring together
joinable tuples are sensitive to the join graph structure
and therefore not oblivious.
Traditional database query processing is non-oblivious
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Figure 1: Two join instances with same in-
put/output sizes
for two reasons: First, traditional query processing pro-
ceeds by identifying a query plan, which is a tree of op-
erators with input tables at the leaves. The operators
are (conceptually) evaluated in a bottom-up fashion and
the output of each operator forms an input of its par-
ent. In some cases, this bottom-up evaluation can be
pipelined. In others, the output of an operator needs
to be generated fully before the parent can consume it,
and such intermediate output needs to be temporarily
stored in untrusted memory. This renders the overall
query processing non-oblivious since the size of the in-
termediate output can vary depending on the database
instance, even if we fix input and output sizes. Sec-
ond, standard implementations of database operators
such as filters, joins, and grouping are not oblivious, so
even if the query plan consisted of a single operator,
the resulting query processing algorithm would not be
oblivious. In summary, traditional query processing is
non-oblivious at both inter- and intra-operator levels,
and we need to fundamentally rethink query processing
to make it oblivious.
Our first main algorithmic contribution is that a sur-
prisingly rich class of database queries admit efficient
oblivious algorithms (Sections 3, 4 and 5).
Theorem 1. (Informal) There exists an oblivious (se-
cure) query processing algorithm that requires O(log n)
storage in TM for any database query involving joins,
grouping aggregation (as the outermost operation), and
filters, if (1) the non-foreign key join graph is acyclic
and (2) all grouping attributes are connected through
foreign key joins, where n denotes the sum of query in-
put and output sizes. Further, assuming no auxiliary
structures, the running time of the algorithm is within
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O(log n) (multiplicative factor) of the running time of
the best insecure algorithm.
Theorem 1 suggests an interesting connection between
secure query processing and database join theory since
acyclic joins are a class of join queries known to be
tractable [24]. We note that the class of queries is
fairly broad and representative of real-world analytical
queries. For example, most queries in the well-known
TPC-H benchmark [31] belong to this class, i.e., admit
efficient secure algorithms.
Assuming no auxiliary structures such as indexes, our
algorithms are efficient and within O(log n) of the run-
ning time of the best insecure algorithm. While the no-
index condition makes our results less relevant for trans-
actional workloads, where indexes play an important
role, they are quite relevant for analytical workloads
where indexes play a less critical role. In fact, query
processing in emerging database architectures such as
column stores [1] has limited or no dependence on in-
dexes.
Further, with minor modifications to our algorithms
using the oblivious external memory sort algorithm of [13],
we get oblivious and secure algorithms with excellent
external (untrusted) memory characteristics.
Theorem 2. (Informal) For the class of queries in
Theorem 1 there exists an oblivious (secure) algorithm
with I/O complexity within multiplicative factor
logM/B(n/B) of that of the optimal insecure algorithm,
where B is the block size and M is the TM memory.
In particular, if we have Ω(
√
n) memory in TM our
external memory algorithms perform a constant number
of scans to evaluate the queries they handle.
Interestingly, for the special case of joins, secure al-
gorithms have been studied in the context of privacy
preserving data integration [19]. The algorithm pro-
posed in [19] proceeds by computing a cross product of
the input relations followed by a (secure) filter. Our
algorithms are significantly more efficient and handle
grouping and aggregation.
Negative Results: We have reason to believe that
queries outside of the class specified in Theorem 1 do
not admit secure efficient algorithms. We show that
the existence of secure algorithms would imply more
efficient algorithms for variants of classic hard problems
such as 3SUM (Section 6). These hardness arguments
suggest that we must accept a weaker notion of security
if we wish to support a larger class of queries.
1.2 Oblivious RAM Simulations
ORAM simulations first proposed by Goldreich and
Ostrovsky [10] is a general technique for making mem-
ory accesses oblivious that works for arbitrary programs.
Specifically, ORAM simulation is the online transforma-
tion of an arbitrary program P to an equivalent program
P ′ whose memory accesses appear random (more pre-
cisely, drawn from some distribution that depends only
on the number of memory accesses of P ). By running P ′
within a secure CPU (TM) and using suitable encryp-
tion, an adversary observing the sequence of memory
accesses to an untrusted memory learns nothing about
P and its data other than its number of memory ac-
cesses. Current ORAM simulation techniques work by
adding a virtualization layer that continuously shuffles
(untrusted) memory contents and adds spurious mem-
ory accesses, so that the resulting access pattern looks
random.
A natural idea for oblivious query processing, imple-
mented in a recent system [20], would be to run a stan-
dard query processing algorithm under ORAM simu-
lation. However, the resulting query processing is not
secure for our definition of security since it reveals more
than just the output size. ORAM simulation, since it is
designed for general programs, does not hide the total
number of memory accesses; in the context of standard
query processing, this reveals the size of intermediate re-
sults in a query plan. Understanding the utility of this
weaker notion of security in the context of a database
system is an interesting direction of future work.
For database queries that admit polynomial time al-
gorithms (which includes queries covered by Theorem 1)
we can design oblivious algorithms based on ORAM
simulation: the number of memory accesses of such
an algorithm is bounded by some polynomial4 p(n,m),
where n is the input size, and m, the output size. We
modify the algorithm with dummy memory accesses
so that the number of memory accesses for any in-
stance with input size n and output size m is exactly
p(n,m). An ORAM simulation of the modified algo-
rithm is oblivious. We note that we need to precisely
specify p(n,m) upto constants (not asymptotically), oth-
erwise the number of memory accesses would be slightly
different for different (n,m) intances making the over-
all algorithm non-oblivious. In practice, working out
a precise upper-bound p(n,m) for arbitrarily complex
queries is a non-trivial undertaking.
Our algorithms which are designed to exploit the struc-
ture and semantics of queries have significant perfor-
mance benefits over the ORAM-based technique sketched
above given the current state-of-the-art in ORAM sim-
ulation. For simplicity, assume for this discussion that
the query output size m = O(n). For small TM memory
(polylog(n)), the current best ORAM simulation tech-
niques [29, 18] incur an overhead of Θ(log2 n) memory
accesses per memory access of the original algorithm.
This implies that the time complexity of any ORAM-
based query processing algorithm is lower-bounded by
Ω(n log2 n). In contrast, our algorithms have a time
4This argument does not depend on p being a polynomial,
any function works.
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complexity of O(n log n) and use O(log n) TM memory.
Also, by construction ORAM simulation randomly
sprays memory accesses and destroys locality of refer-
ence, reducing effectiveness of caching and prefetching
in a memory hierarchy. In a disk setting, a majority
of memory accesses result in a random disk seek and
we can show that any ORAM-based query processing
algorithm incurs Ω( nB logM log
2 n
B ) disk seeks, where M
denotes the size of TM memory. In contrast, all of our
algorithms are scan-based except for the oblivious sort-
ing, which incurs O(logM/B(n/B)) · o(n/B) seeks.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 Database Preliminaries
A relation schema, R(A¯), consists of a relation sym-
bol R and associated attributes A¯ = (A1, . . . , Ak); we
use Attr(R) to denote the set of attributes {A1, . . . , Ak}
of R. An attribute Ai has an associated set of values
called its domain, denoted D(Ai). We use D(R) to de-
note D(A¯) = D(A1)× . . .×D(Ak). A database schema
is a set of relation schemas R1, . . . , Rm. A (relation) in-
stance corresponding to schema R(A1, . . . , Ak) is a bag
(multiset) of tuples of the form 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 where each
ai ∈ D(Ai). A database instance is a set of relation
instances. In the following we abuse notation and use
the term relation (resp. database) to denote both rela-
tion schema and instance (resp. database schema and
instance). We sometimes refer to relations as tables and
attributes as columns.
Given a tuple t ∈ R and an attribute A ∈ Attr(R),
t[A] denotes the value of the tuple on attribute A; as
a generalization of this notation, if A ⊆ Attr(R) is a
set of attributes, t[A] denotes the tuple t restricted to
attributes in A.
We consider two classes of database queries. A select-
project-join (SPJ) query is of the form piA(σP (R1 ./
· · · ./ Rq)), where the projection pi is duplicate pre-
serving (we use multiset semantics for all queries) and
./ refers to the natural join. For R1 ./ R2, each tu-
ple t1 ∈ R1 joins with each tuple t2 ∈ R2 such that
t1[Attr(R1) ∩ Attr(R2)] = t2[Attr(R1) ∩ Attr(R2)] to
produce an output tuple t over attributes Attr(R1) ∪
Attr(R2) that agrees with t1 on attributes Attr(R1)
and with t2 on attributes Attr(R2). The second class
of queries involves grouping and aggregation and is of
the form G
F (A)
G (σP (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq)) and we call such
queries GSPJ queries. Given relation R, G ⊆ Attr(R),
A ∈ Attr(R), GF (A)G (R), represents grouping by at-
tributes in G and computing aggregation function F
over attribute A.
2.2 Secure Query Processing
A relation encryption scheme is used to encrypt rela-
tions. It is a triple of polynomial algorithms (Enc,Dec,Gen)
where Gen takes a security parameter k and returns a
key K; Enc takes a key K, a plaintext relation instance
R and returns a ciphertext relation CR; Dec takes a ci-
phertext relation CR and key K and returns plaintext
relation R if K was the key under which CR was pro-
duced. A relation encryption scheme is also a database
encryption scheme: to encrypt a database instance we
simply encrypt each relation in the database.
Informally, a relation encryption scheme is IND-CPA
secure if a polynomial time adversary with access to en-
cryption oracle cannot distinguish between the encryp-
tion of two instances R(1) and R(2) of relation schema R
such that |R(1)| = |R(2)| (|R(1)| denotes the number of
tuples in R(1)). Assuming all tuples of a given schema
have the same representational length (or can be made
so using padding), we can construct IND-CPA secure
relation encryption by encrypting each tuple using a
standard encryption scheme such as AES in CBC mode
(which is believed to be IND-CPA secure for message
encryption). The detail that encryption is at a tuple-
granularity is relevant for our algorithms which assume
that we can read and decrypt one tuple at a time.
Our formal definition of secure query processing cap-
tures: (1) Database security: An adversary with knowl-
edge of a query does not learn anything other than the
result size of the query by observing query execution;
(2) Query security: An adversary without knowledge of
the query does not learn the constants in the query from
query execution. Appendix A contains a discussion of
query security.
A query template Q is a set of queries that differ only
in constants. An example template is the set {σA=1(R),
σA=2(R), · · · } which we denote σA=∗(R).
A query processing algorithm AQ for a query tem-
plate Q takes as input an encrypted database instance
EncK(D), a query Q ∈ Q and produces as output
EncK(Q(D)); Algorithm AQ has access to encryption
key K and the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Our goal is to make algorithm AQ secure against a pas-
sive adversary who observes its execution. Algorithm
AQ runs within the trusted module TM. The TM also
has a small amount of internal storage invisible to the
adversary. Algorithm AQ has access to a large amount
of untrusted storage which is sufficient to store EncK(D)
and any intermediate state required by AQ. The trace
of an execution of algorithm AQ is the sequence of
untrusted memory accesses read(i) and write(i, value),
where i denotes the memory location.
We define security of algorithm AQ using the follow-
ing indistinguishability experiment:
1. Pick K ← Gen(1k)
2. The adversary A picks two queries Q1 ∈ Q, Q2 ∈
Q with the same template and two database in-
stances D(1) = {R(1)1 , . . . , R(1)n } and D(2) =
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{R(2)1 , . . . , R(2)n } having the same schema such that
(1) |R(1)i | = |R(2)i | for all i ∈ [1, n]; and (2)
|Q1(D(1))| = |Q2(D(2))|.
3. Pick a random bit b← {0, 1} and let τb denote the
trace of AQ(EncK(D(b)), Qb).
4. The adversary A outputs prediction b′ given τb,
EncK(D
(b)), and EncK(Qb(D
(b))).
We say adversary A succeeds if b′ = b. Algorithm AQ
is secure if for any polynomial time adversary A, the
probability of success is at most 1/2 + negl(k) for some
negligible function5 negl . We note that our definition
of security captures both database security, since an
adversary can pick Q1 = Q2, and query security, since
an adversary can pick D(1) = D(2).
2.3 Oblivious Query Processing
As discussed in Section 1, oblivious query processing
is a simpler notion that is equivalent to secure query
processing. Fix an algorithm AQ. For an input I =
EncK(D) and query Q ∈ Q, the memory access se-
quenceMAQ(I,Q) is the sequence of UM memory reads
r(i) and writes w(i), where i denotes the memory loca-
tion; the value being read/written is not part of
MAQ(I,Q). In general, AQ is randomized and
MAQ(I,Q) is a random variable defined over all pos-
sible memory access sequences. Algorithm AQ is obliv-
ious if the distribution of its memory access sequences is
independent of database contents once we fix the query
output and database size. Formally, Algorithm AQ is
oblivious if for any memory access sequence M , any
two queries Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, any two database encryptions
I1 = EncK1(D
(1)), I2 = EncK2(D
(2)):
Pr[MAQ(I1, Q1) = M ] = Pr[MAQ(I2, Q2) = M ]
where D(1) = {R(1)1 , . . . , R(1)n } and D(2) = {R(2)1 , . . . ,
R
(2)
n } have the same schema and: (1) |R(1)i | = |R(2)i | for
all i ∈ [1, n]; and (2) |Q1(D(1))| = |Q2(D(2))|.
Our definition of obliviousness is more stringent than
the one used in ORAM simulation. In ORAM simu-
lation, the memory access distribution can depend on
the total number of memory accesses, while our defini-
tion precludes dependence on the total number of mem-
ory accesses once the query input and output sizes are
fixed. The following theorem establishes the connection
between oblivious and secure query processing.
Theorem 3. Assuming one-way functions exist, the
existence of an oblivious algorithm for a query template
Q implies the existence of a secure algorithm for Q with
the same asymptotic performance characteristics (TM
memory required, running time).
5A negligible function negl(k) is a function that grows slower
than 1
p(k)
for any polynomial p(k); e.g., 1
2k
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Figure 2: Illustration of Oblivious Binary Join
The idea of using obliviousness to derive security from
access pattern leakage was originally proposed in [10]
and the proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the proof of
analogous Theorem 3.1.1 in [10]. Informally, we get se-
cure query processing by ensuring both data security of
values stored in untrusted memory and access pattern
obliviousness. Data security can be achieved by using
encryption, and secure encryption schemes exist assum-
ing the existence of one-way functions. It follows that
the existence of oblivious query processing algorithms
implies the existence of secure algorithms. Based on
Theorem 3, the rest of the paper focuses on oblivious
query processing and does not directly deal with en-
cryption and data security.
3. INTUITION
This section presents a high level intuition behind
our algorithms. Consider the binary join R(A, . . .) ./
S(A, . . .) and the join graph instance shown in Fig-
ure 2(a). Lower case letters a, b, represent values of
the joining column A; ignore the subscripts on a and b
for now. We add identifiers r1-r3 and s1-s4 to tuples so
that we can refer to them in text.
Our oblivious binary join algorithm works in two
stages: In the first stage, we compute the contribu-
tion of each tuple to the final output. This is simply
the degree of the tuple in the join graph; this value is
shown within parenthesis in Figure 2(a). For example,
the degree of r1 is 3, and degree of r2, 1. In the sec-
ond stage, we expand R to Rexp by duplicating each
tuple as many times as its degree; r1 occurs 3 times in
Rexp, r2 once, and so on. We similarly, expand S to
Sexp. The expansions Rexp and Sexp are shown within
boxed rectangles in Figure 2(b). The final join output
is produced by “stitching” together Rexp and Sexp as
illustrated in Figure 2(b). The expansions Rexp and
Sexp are sequences whose ordering is picked carefully to
ensure that stitching the ith tuple in Rexp with the ith
tuple in Sexp indeed produces the correct join output.
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Figure 3: Illustration of primitives: R˜← R.(B ←
2A).(C ← IDA).(D ← RSum(B)).(E n← Sum(S.B)).
r1-r3 and s1-s3 are names we use to refer to the
tuples.
A central component of the above algorithm are obliv-
ious implementations of two simple primitives that we
call semi-join aggregation and expansion. Semi-join ag-
gregation computes the degree of each tuple in a join
and expansion expands a relation by duplicating each
tuple a certain number of times such as its degree.
The same approach generalizes to multiway joins if
the overall query is acyclic [24]. Informally, to compute
R ./ S ./ T , we would compute the contribution of each
tuple to the final join output and use these values to ex-
pand input relations to Rexp, Sexp, and Texp, which are
then stitched together to produce the final join output.
4. PRIMITIVES
This section introduces a few core primitives and
presents oblivious algorithms—algorithms that have the
same UM memory access patterns once we fix input
and output sizes—for these primitives. These primi-
tives serve two purposes: First, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3, they are building blocks for our oblivious query
processing algorithms; Second, they introduce notation
to help us concisely specify our algorithms, and reason
about their obliviousness and performance.
There exist oblivious algorithms for all the primitives
of this section having time complexity O(n log n) and
requiring O(log n) TM memory, where n denotes the
sum of input and output sizes. Some of these algo-
rithms rely on an oblivious sort; an optimal O(n log n)
oblivious sort algorithm that uses O(1) TM memory is
presented in [11]. Due to space constraints we defer pre-
senting oblivious algorithms for the simpler primitives
to the full version of the paper [5].
Relation Augmentation: This primitive adds a de-
rived column to a relation. In the simplest form the
derived column is obtained by applying a function to
existing columns; many primitives we introduce sub-
sequently are more complex instantiations of relation
augmentation. We use the notation R.(A ← Func)
to represent relation augmentation which adds a new
derived column A using some function Func and pro-
duces an output relation with schema Attr(R) ∪ {A}.
For example, R.(B ← 2A) adds a new column B whose
value is twice that of A (see Figure 3). Our notation
allows composition to be expressed more concisely; e.g.,
R.(B ← 2A).(F ← A+B).
Grouping Identity: This relation augmentation prim-
itive adds a new identity column within a group; iden-
tity column values are of the form 1, 2, . . .. In particular,
we use the notation R.(A ← IDOG ) where G ⊆ Attr(R)
is a set of grouping columns and O ⊆ Attr(R) is a set
of ordering columns. To get the output, we partition
the tuples by the grouping columns G, order the tuples
within each partition by O, and assign ids based on this
ordering. (We break ties arbitrarily, so the output can
be non-deterministic.) G and O can be empty and omit-
ted. For example, R.(Id← ID) assigns an unique id to
each record in R. In Figure 3, for R.(C ← IDA), we
partition by A, so r1 and r3 go to the same partition;
tuple r1 gets a C value of 1, and r3, a C value of 2.
Grouping Running Sum: This primitive is a gen-
eralization of grouping identity and adds a running sum
column to a relation. It is represented
R.(A ← RSumOG (B)); it groups a relation by G and
orders tuples in a group by O and stores the running
sum of B column values in a new column A. In partic-
ular, grouping identity R.(Id ← IDOG ) can be expressed
as R.(X ← 1).(Id ← RSumOG (X)). See Figure 3 for an
example.
Generalized Union: A generalized union of R and S,
denotedR∪¯S, produces a relation with schema Attr(R)∪
Attr(S) that contains tuples from both R and S. Tu-
ples of R have a null value for attributes in Attr(S) −
Attr(R), and those of S, a null value for attributes in
Attr(R)−Attr(S).
Sequences: Sorting and Stitching: Although the
inputs and outputs of our algorithms are relations rep-
resented as sequences, the ordering is often unimportant
and we mostly do not emphasize the sequentiality. We
use the notation 〈R〉 to represent some sequence corre-
sponding to R. When a particular ordering is desired,
we represent the ordering as 〈R〉O where O ⊆ Attr(R)
denote the ordering attributes.
One operation on sequences that cannot be repre-
sented over bags is “stitching” two sequences of the
same length (see Figure 2(b) for an example): Given
two sequences 〈R〉 and 〈S〉 of the same length n, the
operation 〈R〉·〈S〉 produces a sequence of length n with
schema Attr(R) ∪ Attr(S) and the ith tuple of the se-
quence is obtained by concatenating the ith tuple of 〈R〉
and the ith tuple of 〈S〉; we ensure when invoking this
operation that the ith tuples of both sequences agree
on Attr(R) ∩Attr(S) if the intersection is nonempty.
Filters: Consider the filter σP (R). The simple algo-
rithm that scans each tuple t ∈ R, checks if it satisfies
P , and outputs it if does, is not oblivious. (E.g., sim-
ply reordering tuples in R changes the memory write
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Algorithm 1 Semi-Join Aggregation: R.(X
n←
Sum(S.Y ))
1: procedure SemiJoinAgg(R,S,X, Y )
2: R˜← R.(Src ← 1).(Y ← 0)
3: S˜ ← S.(Src ← 0)
4: U ← R˜ ∪¯ S˜
5: U ← U.(X ← RSumSrcAttr(R)∩Attr(S)(Y ))
6: Output piAttr(R),X(σSrc=1(U))
7: end procedure
pattern.)
The oblivious sorting algorithm can be used to design
a simple oblivious algorithm for selection (filter). To
evaluate σP (R), we sort R such that tuples that satisfy
predicate P occur before tuples that do not. We scan
the sorted table and output the tuples that satisfy P
and stop when we encounter the first tuple that does not
satisfy P . The overall data access pattern depends only
on input and output sizes and is therefore oblivious.
4.1 Semi-Join Aggregation
Semi-join aggregation, denoted R.(A
n← Sum(S.B)),
is equivalent6 to the relational algebra expression
G
A←SUM(S.B)
Attr(R) (R ./ S). This operation adds a new de-
rived column A; for each tuple tR ∈ R, we obtain value
of A by identifying all tS ∈ S that join with tR (agree
on all common attributes Attr(R) ∩Attr(S)) and sum-
ming over tS [B] values. As discussed in Section 3, we
introduce this primitive to compute the degree of a tu-
ple in a join graph. In particular, the degree of each
R tuple in R ./ S is obtained by S˜ ← S.(X ← 1),
R.(Degree
n← Sum(S˜.X)). In Figure 3, r2 joins with
two tuples s2 and s3, so r2[E] is s2[B] + s3[B] = 2.
Oblivious Algorithm: Algorithm 1 presents an obliv-
ious algorithm for semi-join aggregation
R.(X
n← Sum(S.Y )). (In all our algorithms, each step
involves one of our primitives and is implemented us-
ing the oblivious algorithm for the primitive.) It adds
a “lineage” column Src in Steps 2 and 3; the value of
Src is set to 1 for all R tuples and 0 for all S tuples.
A Y column initialized to 0 is added to all R tuples.
Step 4 computes a generalized union U of R˜ and S˜.
Adding the running sum within each Attr(R)∩Attr(S)
group adds the required aggregation value into each R
tuple (Step 5); the running sum computation is or-
dered by Src to ensure that all S tuples within an
Attr(R)∩Attr(S) group occur before the R tuples. Fi-
nally, the oblivious filter σSrc=1 in Step 6 extracts the R
tuples from U . Figure 4 shows the intermediate tables
generated by Algorithm 1 for sample tables R(Id,A)
and S(A, Y ).
6This equality holds only when R has not duplicates.
Id A Y Src
1 a 0 1
2 b 0 1
A Y Src
a 2 0
b 3 0
a 4 0
Id A Y Src X
- a 2 0 2
- a 4 0 6
1 a 0 1 6
- b 3 0 3
2 b 0 1 3
(a): R˜ (b): S˜ (c): U
Figure 4: Sample computation of R.(X
n←
Sum(S.Y ))
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 obliviously computes semi-
join aggregation R.(X
n← Sum(S.Y )) of two tables in
O((nR + nS) log(nR + nS)) time and using O(1) TM
memory, where nR = |R| and nS = |S| denote the input
table sizes.
Proof. (Sketch) For each step of Algorithm 1 the
input and output sizes are one of nR, nS , and nR + nS
and each step is locally oblivious in its input and out-
put sizes. The overall algorithm is therefore oblivious.
Further, the oblivious algorithms for each step require
O(1) TM memory.
4.2 Expansion
This primitive duplicates each tuple of a relation a
number of times as specified in one of the columns. In
particular, the output of ExpW (R), W ∈ Attr(R) and
D(W ) ⊆ N is a relation instance with same schema,
Attr(R), that has t[W ] copies of each tuple t ∈ R. For
example, given an instance of R(A,W ) : {〈a, 1〉, 〈b, 2〉},
ExpW (R) is given by {〈a, 1〉, 〈b, 2〉, 〈b, 2〉}. As discussed
in Section 3, expansion plays a central role in our join
algorithms.
4.2.1 Oblivious Algorithm
We now present an oblivious algorithm to compute
ExpW (R). For presentational simplicity, we slightly
modify the representation of the input. The modified
input to the expansion is a sequence of pairs (〈r1, w1〉,
. . . , 〈rn, wn〉), where ris are values (tuples) drawn from
some domain and wi ∈ N are non-negative weights. The
desired output is some sequence containing (in any or-
der) wi copies of each ri. We call such a sequence a
weighted sequence.
The input size of expansion is n and the output size
is m
def
=
∑n
i=1 wi, so memory access pattern of an obliv-
ious algorithm depends on only these two quantities.
The naive algorithm that reads each 〈ri, wi〉 into TM
and writes out wi copies of ri is not oblivious, since the
output pattern depends on individual weights wi.
We first present an oblivious algorithm when the in-
put sequence has a particular property we call prefix-
heavy ; we use this algorithm as a subroutine in the al-
gorithm for the general case.
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Algorithm 2 Oblivious Expansion of prefix heavy se-
quences
1: procedure ExpandPrefixHeavy(I)
Assume: I = (〈r1, w1〉, . . . , 〈rn, wn〉)
Require: I is prefix heavy
2: wavg ← (
∑n
i=1 wi)/n
3: CTM ← φ . counters within TM
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: Read 〈ri, wi〉 to TM.
6: wcurr ← bi · wavgc − b(i− 1) · wavgc
7: if wi ≤ wcurr then
8: Append wi copies of ri to output
9: wcurr ← wcurr − wi
10: else
11: CTM [ri]← wi
12: end if
13: while wcurr > 0 do
14: rj ← argmink rk has a counter in CTM
15: if CTM [rj ] > wcurr then
16: Append wcurr copies of rj to output
17: CTM [rj ]← CTM [rj ]− wcurr
18: wcurr ← 0
19: else
20: Append CTM [rj ] copies of rj to output
21: wcurr ← wcurr − CTM [rj ]
22: // CTM [rj ]← 0
23: Remove rj from CTM
24: end if
25: end while
26: endfor
27: end procedure
Definition 5. A weighted sequence (〈r1, w1〉, . . . ,
〈rn, wn〉) is prefix-heavy if for each ` ∈ [1, n],
1
`
∑`
i=1 wi ≥ 1n
∑n
i=1 wi.
The average weight of any prefix of a prefix-heavy se-
quence is greater-than-or-equal to the overall average
weight. Any weighted sequence can be reordered to
get a prefix-heavy sequence, e.g., by sorting by non-
decreasing weight. The sequence (〈a, 4〉, 〈b, 1〉, 〈c, 2〉) is
prefix-heavy, while (〈b, 1〉, 〈a, 4〉, 〈c, 2〉) is not.
Algorithm 2 presents an oblivious algorithm for ex-
panding prefix heavy weighted sequences. To expand
the sequence I = (〈r1, w1〉, . . . , 〈rn, wn〉), the algorithm
proceeds in n (input-output) steps. Let wavg = (
∑n
i=1 wi)/n
denote the average weight of the sequence. In each step,
it reads one weighted record (Step 5) and produces wavg
(unweighted) records in the output; the actual number
wcurr is either bwavgc or dwavge, when wavg is fractional
(Step 6).
Call a record 〈ri, wi〉 light if wi ≤ wavg and heavy,
otherwise. If the current record 〈ri, wi〉 is light, wi
copies of ri are produced in the output; if it is heavy,
a counter C[ri] is initialized with count wi denoting the
number of copies of ri available for (future) outputs.
Previously seen heavy records are used to make up the
“balance” and ensure wavg records are produced in each
step. The counters C are internal to TM and are not
part of the data access pattern. Figure 5 shows the steps
of Algorithm 2 for the sequence (〈a, 4〉, 〈b, 1〉, 〈c, 2〉).
Step Input Output Counters
1 〈a, 4〉 a, a C[a] = 2
2 〈b, 1〉 b, a, a C = φ
3 〈c, 2〉 c, c C = φ
Figure 5: Algorithm 2 over sequence
(〈a, 4〉, 〈b, 1〉, 〈c, 2〉)
Algorithm 2 is oblivious since its input-output pat-
tern is fixed once the input size n and output size m =∑n
i=1 wi is fixed. Note that wavg = m/n is fixed once
input and output sizes are fixed.
In the worst case, the number of counters maintained
by Algorithm 2 can be Ω(n).
Example 2. Consider the sequence w1 = · · · = wn/4 =
4 and wn/2+1 = · · · = wn = 0. After reading n/4
records, we can show that Algorithm 2 requires ≈ 3n/16
counters.
However, any weighted sequence can be re-ordered so
that it is prefix heavy and the number of counters used
by Algorithm 2 is O(1) as stated in Lemma 6 and illus-
trated in the following example.
Example 3. We can reorder the weight sequence in
Example 2 as 〈4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 〉 interleaving 3 light
records inbetween two heavy records. We can show that
Algorithm 2 requires just one counter for this sequence.
More generally, the basic idea is to interleave sufficient
number of light records between two heavy records so
that average weight of any prefix is barely above the
overall average, which translates to fewer number of
counters. In Example 3, we can suppress just one heavy
record to make the average weight of any prefix ≤ wavg .
We call such sequences barely prefix heavy.
Lemma 6. Any weighted sequence I can be re-ordered
as a prefix heavy sequence I ′ such that Algorithm 2 re-
quires O(1) counters to process I ′.
Lemma 6 suggests that we can design a general al-
gorithm for expansion by first reordering the input se-
quence to be barely prefix heavy and using Algorithm 2.
The main difficulty lies in obliviously reordering the se-
quence to make it barely prefix heavy. We do not know
how to do this directly; instead, we transform the input
sequence to a modified sequence by rounding weights
(upwards) to be a power of 2. We can concisely repre-
sent the full rounded weight distribution using logarith-
mic space. We store this rounded distribution within
TM and use it to generate a barely prefix heavy se-
quence. Details of the algorithm to reorder a sequence
to make it barely prefix heavy is presented in the full-
version of the paper [5].
Algorithm 3 presents our oblivious expansion algo-
rithm. Step 3 performs weight rounding. Directly ex-
panding with these rounded weights produces a sequence
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Algorithm 3 Oblivious Expansion ExpW (R)
1: procedure Expand(R,W )
2: m← GSUM(W ) . output size
3: R˜← R.(W˜ ← 2dlog2We) . weight rounding
4: m˜← GSUM(W˜ ) . assert: m˜ < 2m
5: R˜← R˜ ∪¯ {〈dummy〉}.(W ← 0).(W˜ ← 2m− m˜)
6: DTM ← GCOUNT(∗)W˜ (R˜) . rounded weight distr
7: R˜← R˜.(Id ← ID) . Attach ids
8: 〈R˜bph〉 ←ReorderBarelyPrefixHeavy(R˜, D˜TM )
9: R˜exp ←ExpandPrefixHeavy(〈R˜bph〉)
10: R˜exp ← R˜exp .(Rank ← IDId )
11: Output piAttr(R)(σRank<=W (R˜exp))
12: end procedure
of length m˜; the resulting algorithm would not be obliv-
ious since m˜ does not depend on n and m (output size)
alone. We therefore add (Step 5) a dummy tuple with
rounded weight 2m−m˜ (and actual weight 0). Expand-
ing this table produces 2m tuples. Step 6 computes
the distribution of rounded weights. We note that this
step consumes R˜ and produces no output since DTM re-
mains within TM. Step 8 reorders the table (sequence)
to make it barely prefix heavy which is expanded using
Algorithm 2 in Step 9. Steps 10 and 11 filter out dummy
tuples produced due to rounding using an oblivious se-
lection algorithm.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 3 obliviously expands an in-
put table in time O((n+m) log(n+m)) using O(log(n+
m)) TM memory, where n and m denote the input and
output sizes, respectively.
Proof. (Sketch) The input size of each step is one
of n, n+ 1 or m. The output size of each step is one of
1, n, n + 1, or m. Each step is locally oblivious, so all
data access patterns are fixed once we fix n and m.
5. QUERY PROCESSING ALGORITHMS
We now present oblivious query processing algorithms
for SPJ and GSPJ queries. Recall from Section 2.1
that these are of the form piA(σP (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq))
and G
F (X)
G (σP (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq)). Instead of present-
ing a single algorithm, we present algorithms for var-
ious special cases that together formalize (and prove)
the informal characterization in Theorem 1. We begin
by presenting in Section 5.1 an oblivious algorithm for
binary join. In Section 5.2 we discuss extensions to mul-
tiway joins. Section 5.3 discusses grouping and aggre-
gation, Section 5.4 discusses selection predicates, and
Section 5.5 discusses how key-foreign key constraints
can be exploited.
5.1 Binary Join
Recall the discussion from Section 3 (Figure 2) which
presents the high level intuition behind our binary join
algorithm: Informally, to computeR(A, . . .) ./ S(A, . . .)
Algorithm 4 Binary Natural Join: R ./ S
1: procedure BinaryJoin(R,S)
2: J ← Attr(R) ∩Attr(S) . join attrs
3: R˜← R.(N ← 1) . tuple multiplicity
4: R˜← R˜.(Id ← ID) . Add an id column
5: S˜ ← S.(N ← 1) . tuple multiplicity
6: S˜ ← S˜.(Id ← ID) . Add an id column
7: R˜← R˜.(NS n← Sum(S.N)) . Compute degree
8: S˜ ← S˜.(NR n← Sum(R.N)) . Compute degree
9: S˜ ← S˜.(JId ← IDJ )
10: Rexp ← ExpNS (R˜)
11: Rexp ← Rexp.(JId ← IDId )
12: Sexp ← ExpNR (S˜)
13: Output piAttr(R)∪Attr(S)(〈Rexp〉J ,JId .〈Sexp〉J ,JId )
14: end procedure
we begin by computing the degree of each tuple of R
and S in the join graph; we use semi-join aggregation to
compute the degree. We then expand R and S to Rexp
and Sexp by duplicating each tuple of R and S as many
times as its degree. By construction, Rexp contains the
R-half of join tuples and Sexp contains the S-half, and
we stitch them together to produce the final join output
(see Figure 2(b)).
One remaining detail is to order Rexp and Sexp so
that they can be stitched to get the join result. Simply
ordering by the join column values does not necessarily
produce the correct result. We attach a subscript to join
values on the S side so that different occurrences of the
same value get a different subscript; the three a values
now become a1, a2, a3. We expand S as before remem-
bering the subscripts, so there are two copies each of a1,
a2, and a3. We expand R slightly differently: each a tu-
ple on R is expanded 3 times and we produce one copy
of each subscript. For example, tuple r1 is expanded to
(r1, a1), (r1, a2) and (r1, a3). Sorting by the subscripted
values and stitching produces the correct join result.
Formal Algorithm: Algorithm 4 presents our join al-
gorithm. Steps 7 and 8 compute the join degrees (NS
and NR, resp) for each R and S tuple using a semi-join
aggregation. Step 9 is a grouping identity operation.
All S tuples agreeing on join columns J belong to the
same group, and each gets a different identifier. This
step plays the role of assigning subscripts to S tuples in
Figure 2(a). Steps 10 and 12 expand R˜ and S˜ based on
the join degrees. Step 11 is another grouping identity
operation. All tuples in Rexp that originated from the
same R tuple belong to the same group, and each gets
a different identifier. This has the effect of expanding
R tuples with a different subscript. Step 13 stitches
expansions of R and S to get the final join output. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates Algorithm 4 for the example shown in
Figure 2. Note the correspondence between Jid column
values and subscripts in Figure 2.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 4 obliviously computes the
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Id A N NS
1 a 1 3
2 b 1 1
3 a 1 3
Id A N NR JId
1 a 1 2 1
2 b 1 1 1
3 a 1 2 2
4 a 1 2 3
(a): R˜ (b): S˜
Id A Jid
1 a 1
3 a 1
1 a 2
3 a 2
1 a 3
3 a 3
2 b 1
Id A Jid
1 a 1
1 a 1
3 a 2
3 a 2
4 a 3
4 a 3
2 b 1
(c): 〈Re〉A,Jid (d): 〈Se〉A,Jid
Figure 6: Intermediate tables used by Algo-
rithm 4 for Example of Figure 2. Only relevant
columns of Rexp and Sexp are shown.
binary natural join of two tables R and S in time
Θ(nR log nR + nS log nS + m logm), where nR = |R|,
nS = |S|, and m = |R ./ S| using O(log(nR +nS)) TM
memory.
5.2 Multiway Join
We now consider multiway joins, i.e., natural joins
between q relations R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq. When the multi-
way join has a property called acyclicity there exists an
efficient oblivious algorithm for evaluating the join.
The algorithm for evaluating a multiway join is a gen-
eralization of the algorithm for binary join. Informally,
we compute the contribution of each tuple in R1, . . . , Rq
towards the final join. The contribution generalizes the
notion of a join-graph degree in the binary join case,
and this quantity can be computed by performing a
sequence of semi-join aggregations between the input
relations. We expand the input relations R1, . . . , Rq to
R1,exp, . . . , Rq,exp respectively by duplicating each tu-
ple as many times as its contribution, and stitch the
expanded tables to produce the final join output. The
details of ordering the expansions R1,exp, . . . , Rq,exp are
now more involved. A formal description of the overall
algorithm is deferred to the full-version [5]. Here we
present a formal characterization of the class of multi-
way join queries our algorithm is able to handle.
Definition 9. The multiway join query R1 ./ · · · ./
Rq is called acyclic, if we can arrange the relations
R1, . . . , Rq as nodes in a tree T such that for all i, j, k ∈
[1, q] such that Rk is along the path from Ri to Rj in
T , Attr(Ri) ∩Attr(Rj) ⊆ Attr(Rk).
Theorem 10. There exists an oblivious algorithm to
compute the natural join query (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq) pro-
vided the query is acyclic. Further, the time complex-
ity of the algorithm is Θ(n log n + m logm) where n =
∑
i |Ri| is the input size and m = |R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq| de-
notes the output size, and the TM memory requirement
is O(log(n+m)).
The concept of acyclicity is well-known in database the-
ory [34]; in fact, it represents the class of multiway join
queries for which algorithms polynomial in input and
output size are known. We use the acyclicity property
to compute the contribution of each tuple towards to
the final output using a series of semi-join aggregations.
Without the acyclicity property we do not know of a
way of computing this quantity short of evaluating the
full join.
5.3 Grouping and Aggregation
This section presents an oblivious algorithm for group-
ing aggregation over acyclic joins. We present our algo-
rithm for the case of SUM; it can be easily adapted for
the other standard aggregation functions: MIN, MAX,
AVG, and COUNT. The algorithm handles only a lim-
ited form of grouping where all the grouping attributes
belong to a single relation. The query is therefore of
the form G
SUM(Ra.X)
G (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq), where (wlog)
G ∈ Attr(R1). We believe the case where the grouping
attributes come from multiple relations is hard as we
discuss in Section 6.
Notation: Since the join R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq is acyclic we
can arrange the relations as nodes in a tree T as per
Definition 9. An algorithm for constructing such a tree
is presented in [35]. For the remainder of this section fix
some tree T . Wlog, we assume that relations R1, . . . , Rq
are numbered by a pre-order traversal of tree T so that
if Ri is an ancestor of Rj then i < j. For any relation
Ri, we use #c(i) to denote the number of children and
Rc(i,1), . . . , Rc(i,#c(i)) to denote the children of Ri in T ;
we denote the parent of Ri using Rp(i). We use Desc(Ri)
and Anc(Ri) to denote the descendants and ancestors
of Ri in T ; both Anc(Ri) and Desc(Ri) contain Ri. For
any set R of relations ./ R denotes the natural join of
elements of R; e.g., ./ Desc(Ri) denotes the join of Ri
and it descendants.
Algorithm 5 presents our grouping aggregation al-
gorithm. The algorithm operates in 2 stages: (1) a
bottom-up counting stage and (2) a grouping stage which
works over just R1.
Bottom-up Counting: In this stage, we add an at-
tribute N to each tuple. For a tuple t ∈ Ri, t[N ] denotes
the number of join tuples t is part of in ./ Desc(Ri).
For leaf relations Ri, t[N ] = 1 for all tuples t ∈ Ri. For
non-leaf relations, a simple recursion can be used to
compute the value of attribute N . Consider t ∈ Ri for
some non-leaf Ri and let t[Nc(i,j)] denote the number of
join tuples t is part of in the join ./ ({Ri}∪Desc(Rc(i,j))
(join of all descendants rooted in child Rc(i,j)). Then
we can show using the acyclic property of the join,
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Algorithm 5 Grouping and Aggregation:
G
SUM(Ra.X)
G (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq)
1: procedure GroupingAggr((R1, . . . , Rq),G, Ra.X)
2: for i = q to 1 do
3: R˜i ← Ri
4: if #c(i) = 0 then R˜i ← R˜i.(N ← 1) . leaf table
5: else
6: for j = 1 to #c(i) do
7: R˜i ← R˜i.(Nc(i,j) n← Sum(R˜c(i,j).N))
8: endfor
9: R˜i ← R˜i.(N ← Π#c(i)j=1 Nc(i,j))
10: end if
11: if Ri = Ra then
12: R˜a ← R˜a.(SX ← X ×N)
13: else if Ra ∈ Desc(Ri) then
14: `← unique ` such that Ra ∈ Desc(Rc(i,`))
15: R˜i ← R˜i.(SX n← Sum(Rc(i,`).SX))
16: end if
17: endfor
18: R˜1 ← R˜1.(IdG ← IDG)
19: R˜1 ← R˜1.(RSX ← RSum−IdGG )
20: Output piG,RSX (σIdG=1(R˜1))
21: end procedure
t[N ] = Πjt[Nc(i,j)] (Step 9). In addition, for all re-
lations in Anc(Ra) (Ra is the relation containing ag-
gregated column X), we add a partial aggregation at-
tribute SX . For a tuple t ∈ Ri ∈ Anc(Ra), t[SX ] repre-
sents the sum of Ra.X values in ./ Desc(Ri) considering
only tuples that t is part of.
Grouping: This stage essentially performs the group-
ing G
SUM(SX)
G (R1). We attach a unique id IdG to each
tuple within a group defined by G (Step 18). We then
compute the running sum of SX within each group de-
fined by G; we compute the running sum in descending
order of IdG so that the total sum for a group is stored
with the record with IdG = 1. We get the final out-
put by (obliviously) selecting the records with IdG and
performing suitable projections (Step 20).
Theorem 11. Algorithm 5 obliviously computes the
grouping aggregation G
SUM(Ra.X)
G (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq), G ∈
Attr(R1), where (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq) is acyclic, in time
Θ(n log n) and using O(log n) TM memory, where n =∑
i |Ri| denotes the total size of the input relations.
5.4 Selections
This section discusses how selections in SPJ and GSPJ
queries can be handled. We assume a selection predicate
P is a conjunction of table-level predicates, i.e., of the
form (PRi1 ∧ PRi2 ∧ · · · ) where each PRij : D(Rij ) →
{true, false} is a binary predicate over tuples of Rij .
To handle selections in a GSPJ query G
F (A)
G (σP (R1 ./
· · · ./ Rq)), we modify the bottom-up counting stage of
Algorithm 5 as follows: when processing any relation Ri
with a table-level predicate PRi that is part of P , we set
the value of attribute N to 0 for all tuples ti ∈ Ri for
which PRi(ti) = false; for all other tuples the value of at-
tribute N is calculated as before. We can show that the
resulting algorithm correctly and obliviously evaluates
the query G
F (A)
G (σP (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq)). A similar mod-
ification works for the SPJ query σP (R1 ./ · · · ./ Rq)
and is described in the full version of the paper [5].
5.5 Exploiting Foreign Key Constraints
We informally discuss how we can exploit key-foreign
key constraints; We note that keys and foreign keys are
part of database schema (metadata), and we view them
as public knowledge (see discussion in Appendix A).
Consider a query Q involving a multiway join R1 ./
· · · ./ Rq (with or without grouping) and let Ri (key
side) and Rj (foreign key side) denote two relations in-
volved in a key-foreign key join. We explicitly eval-
uate Rij ← Ri ./ Rj using the oblivious binary join
algorithm and replace references to Ri and Rj in Q
with Rij . From key-foreign key property, it follows that
|Rij | = |Rj |, so this step by itself does not render the
query processing non-oblivious. We treat any foreign
key references to Rj as references to Rij . We continue
to this process of identifying key-foreign key joins and
evaluating them separately until no more such joins ex-
ist. At this point, we revert to the general algorithms
presented in Sections 5.2-5.4 to process the remainder
of the query.
Theorem 12. There exists an oblivious (secure) query
processing algorithm that requires O(log n) storage in
TM for any database query involving joins, grouping
aggregation (as the outermost operation), and filters, if
(1) the non-foreign key join graph is acyclic and (2) all
grouping attributes are connected through foreign key
joins, where n denotes the sum of query input and out-
put sizes. Further, assuming no auxiliary structures,
the running time of the algorithm is within O(log n)
(multiplicative factor) of the running time of the best
insecure algorithm.
Proof. (Sketch) From Theorems 8-11 and the in-
formal descriptions in Section 5.4 and 5.5, it follows
that there exist oblivious query processing algorithms
for above class of queries that run in O(n log n) time and
require O(log n) TM memory. Further, any algorithm
requires Ω(n) time without auxiliary structures.
Theorem 13. For the class of queries in Theorem 12
there exists an oblivious (secure) algorithm with I/O
complexity within multiplicative factor logM/B(n/B) of
that of the optimal insecure algorithm, where B is the
block size and M is the TM memory.
Proof. (Sketch) All of our algorithms are simple
scans except for the steps that perform oblivious sort-
ing. The I/O complexity of oblivious sorting is
O( nB logM/B(
n
B )) [13] from which the theorem follows.
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6. HARDNESS ARGUMENTS
Section 5 presented efficient oblivious algorithms for
evaluating (G)SPJ queries when the underlying join was
acyclic and all grouping columns belonged to a sin-
gle relation. All of our algorithms have time complex-
ity O((n + m) log(n + m)) where n and m and input
and output sizes, respectively. Any algorithm requires
Ω(n+m) time without pre-processing, so our algorithms
are within a log(n+m) factor away from an instance op-
timal algorithm. In the following, we call such oblivious
algorithms instance efficient. While we do not have for-
mal proofs, we present some evidence that suggests that
instance efficient oblivious algorithms for cyclic joins
and for the case where grouping columns come from
different tables seem unlikely to exist.
At a high level, our arguments rely on the following
intuition: if a query Q does not have a near-linear algo-
rithm (with time complexity (n+m)polylog(n+m)) in
the worst case it is unlikely to have an oblivious algo-
rithm since its behavior on an easy instance would be
different from that on a worst case instance. There are
some difficulties directly formalizing this intuition since
some of the computation occurs within TM potentially
without an externally visible data access.
Recent work has identified the following 3SUM prob-
lem as a simple and useful problem for polynomial time
lower-bound reductions [26]: Given an input set of n
numbers identify x, y, z ∈ S such that x+ y = z. There
exists a simple O(n2) algorithm for 3SUM: Store the n
numbers in S in a hashtable H. Consider all pairs of
numbers x, y ∈ S and check if x + y ∈ H. It is widely
believed that this algorithm is the best possible and [26]
uses this 3SUM-hardness conjecture to establish lower
bounds for a variety of combinatorial problems.
We introduce the following simple variant of 3SUM-
hardness that captures the additional complexity of TM
computations. In this variant, an algorithm has access
to a cache of size nδ (δ < 1) words. Access to the cache
is free while accesses to non-cache memory have a unit
(time) cost. We conjecture that having access to a free
cache does not bring down the asymptotic complexity
of 3SUM. For example, in the hashtable based solution
above, only a small part of the input (at most nδ) can be
stored in the cache and most of the hashtable lookups
(n− nδ) incur a non-cache access cost.
Conjecture 14. (3SUM-Cache(δ)-hardness) Any al-
gorithm for 3SUM with input size n having access to a
free cache of size nδ requires Ω(n2−o(1)) time in expec-
tation.
Assuming this conjecture is true, the algorithms of
Section 5 almost represent a characterization of the
class of single-block queries that have an instance ef-
ficient oblivious algorithm.
Theorem 15. There does not exist an instance effi-
cient oblivious algorithm with a TM with memory nδ for
cyclic joins over inputs of size n unless there exists a
subquadratic O(n2−Ω(1)) algorithm for 3SUM-Cache(δ).
Proof. Enumerating m triangles in a graph with m
edges in time O(m4/3−) is 3SUM-hard [26] (Theorem
5). Enumerating triangles can be expressed as a cyclic
join query over the edge relation. It follows that eval-
uating a cyclic join query in O(m + n)4/3− is 3SUM-
hard. The free cache does not affect this reduction from
3SUM to cyclic join evaluation, so evaluating a cyclic
join query using a TM with cache nδ with O(m+n)4/3−
UM memory accesses is 3SUM-Cache(δ)-hard. We can
construct easy instances for all sufficiently large m,n
that only require O(m+ n) processing time. It follows
that there does not exist an instance efficient oblivious
algorithm for cyclic joins.
The set intersection enumeration problem is the fol-
lowing: given k sets S1, . . . , Sk, Si ⊆ U drawn from
some universe U , identify all pairs (i, j) such that Si ∩
Sj 6= φ. A simple algorithm is to build an inverted in-
dex that stores for each element e ∈ S1∪ . . .∪Sk the list
of integers j such that e ∈ Sj . We consider all pairs of
integers within each list and output the pair if we have
not already done so. This simple algorithm is quadratic
in the input and output sizes in the worst case. The set
intersection enumeration problem is fairly well-studied
and is at the core of most high-dimensional [15] and
approximate string matching [3] but no asymptotically
better algorithm is known. There is a simple reduction
from set intersection enumeration to evaluating group-
ing queries where grouping attributes come from multi-
ple relations.
Theorem 16. If there exists a O((n+m)polylog(n+
m)) time algorithm for evaluating GA,B(R(A, Id) ./
S(B, Id)) where n and m are input and output sizes of
the query, then there exists an O((n+m)polylog(n+m))
time algorithm for set intersection enumeration.
Proof. We encode the input to set intersection enu-
meration as two relations R(A, Id) and S(B, Id). The
domain of A and B is U the universe of elements. For
each e ∈ Si we include a tuple (e, i) in both R and
S. (R and S are therefore identical.) The theorem fol-
lows from the observation that the desired output of set
intersection enumeration is precisely GA,B(R(A, Id) ./
S(B, Id)).
Theorem 16 along with the fact that we can construct
an input instance for the queryGA,B(R(A, Id) ./ S(B, Id))
which can be evaluated in O((n + m)polylog(n + m))
time suggests that an oblivious algorithm for this query
is likely to imply a (significantly) better algorithm for
set intersection enumeration than currently known.
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7. RELATEDWORK
While we focused mostly on systems that use trusted
hardware for querying encrypted data, there exist other
approaches. One such approach relies on homomorphic
encryption that allows computation directly over en-
crypted data; e.g., the Paillier cryptosystem [25] allows
us to compute the encryption of (v1 + v2) given the
encryptions of v1 and v2 without requiring the (pri-
vate) encryption key, and can be used to process SUM
aggregation queries [9]. However, despite recent ad-
vances, practical homomorphic encryption schemes are
currently known only for limited classes of computa-
tion. There exist simple queries that the state-of-the-art
systems [27] that rely solely on homomorphic encryp-
tion cannot process. A second approach is to use the
client as the trusted location inaccessible to the adver-
sary [14, 32]. One drawback of using the client is that
some queries might necessitate moving large amounts
of data to the client for query processing and defeat
the very purpose of using a cloud service. We can re-
duce some of the above drawbacks by combining ho-
momorphic encryption with the client processing ap-
proach [32], but, given the current state-of-the-art of
homomorphic encryption, a comprehensive and robust
solution to querying encrypted data seems to require
the trusted hardware architecture we have assumed in
this paper.
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APPENDIX
A. QUERY AND METADATA SECURITY
Ideally a secure query processing system hides both
database contents and queries being evaluated against
the database. Given how databases are typically used,
we believe it is important to study the security of database
contents even if the adversary has full knowledge of the
query. Databases are typically accessed using a front
end application, and the entropy of the queries run over
the database is typically small given knowledge of the
application. As a concrete example, consider a paper re-
view system like EasyChair, which is a web application
that presumably stores and queries papers and review
information using a backend database. The web appli-
cation might itself be well known (or open source [17]),
so the kinds of queries issued to the database is public
knowledge.
That said, the following question remains: To what
extent should a secure query processing system hide
queries? What should an adversary without knowledge
of the query be able to learn? We argue that perfect
query security—being able to mask whether a query is
a single table filter or a 50-table join—is impractical
given the richness of database query languages. Going
the extra mile to hide queries is also wasteful if we as-
sume knowledge of the application is easy to acquire as
in the discussion of the paper review system above.
What an application (source code) does not usually
specify is actual query constants which might be gen-
erated, e.g., by users filling in forms or from values in
the database and it might be valuable (and as it turns
out, easy) to secure these. Accordingly, in this paper we
equate query security with query constants security: an
adversary might learn by observing a query execution,
that e.g., the query is a 2-way join with a filter on the
first table, but she does not learn the filter predicate
constants. We note that this is either explicitly [14, 27,
32] or implicitly [4, 6] the notion of query security used
in prior work.
A related issue is metadata security. Metadata refers
to information such as number of tables and the schema
(column names and types) of each table. While column
and table names can be easily anonymized, for the same
reasons mentioned in query security, formally securing
metadata is both difficult and not very useful if the
adversary has knowledge of the application.
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